God Essay

How is Good Opposed to Evil?

Although J. L. Mackie has a rationally strong claim, it is greatly weakened as it fails to apply to the world, as we know it. Mackie's claim is that good is opposed to evil in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can.1 Mackie purports to say that in any given situation a being that is wholly good will always act only in a good way and will act in such a way as to prevent evil to its best ability. Mackie's argument, from "Evil and Omnipotence", is that God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; yet evil exists.2 With his claim an omnipotent and wholly good thing would not allow evil to exist because it would always eliminate evil as far as it could and since an omnipotent being has no limitations to what it can do, evil could not exist.

One can hardly object to Mackie's claim if one is thinking in terms of a God, especially one who is not bound by causal laws. If one focuses firstly on the claim in isolation than one must apply the claim to our world. Although there seems to be no reason why a wholly good thing would ever allow evil if it was able to prevent it, there are many counterexamples by Alvin C. Platinga to Mackie's claim that show the possibility of instances where Mackie's claim fails.

Platinga puts forward some counterexamples to Mackie's claim in "The Problem of Evil". Platinga says that there occur instances where a good thing is able to eliminate an evil but does not because it does not know about the evil. Mackie's problem here is that he argues his claim with the idea of a God (who is omniscient) in mind and therefore his claim cannot be applied to the real world. Platinga gives an improved version of Mackie's claim, "every good thing always eliminates every evil that it knows about and can eliminate".3 Platinga goes on to deny the truth of this by giving the example of the two stranded hikers. If one has the ability to save either one, but only one stranded hiker, Platinga claims that this proves "it is not a necessary truth or even a truth that every good thing eliminates every evil it knows about and can eliminate".4 One could argue that the fact that the good thing eliminates one evil prevents it from eliminating the other evil. Although this argument is correct it still doesn't deny the fact that the good thing knew and could have eliminated an evil, but did not. Plafinga gives the example of a doctor who chooses not to amputate a leg to eliminate a bruise.5 He shows that a good thing would fail to eliminate an evil if it couldn't eliminate the evil without bringing about a greater evil. A defender of Mackie could reply that this example does not apply to God because God could eliminate the bruise without amputation or God could prevent the bruise from ever occurring. Mackie's claim itself is separate from the idea of an omnipotent, omniscient, good being (God).

Platinga shows definite instances where Mackie's original claim fails. Mackie puts forward his claim in such a way that it is understood to be a fact that applies to the world we know, but his claim can only be proven or correct when applied to his idea of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Mackie's claim is not reliable and is defeated when applied to the world we know.

Endnotes

1 J. L Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence", The Problem of Evil, M.M Adams and R.M. Adams (Oxford University Press, 1990): 26.

2 Ibid, 25.

3 Alvin C. Platinga, "The Problem of Evil", God, Freedom, and Evil. (Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1970): 18.

4 Ibid, 19.

5 Ibid.

Bibliography

Mackie, J.L. "Evil and Omnipotence", The Problem of Evil. M.M Adams and R.M. Adams. Oxford University Press. 1990.

Platinga, Alvin C. "The Problem of Evil", God, Freedom, and Evil. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1970.